The Straits Times, 4 Mar 2014
UKRAINE is on the brink of war following Moscow's decision to send troops into the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, a development which is threatening peace in Europe.
Global leaders, including United States President Barack Obama, have condemned the move. Here's a snapshot of views from different sources to explain the geopolitical backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, Moscow's calculations and and possible options for the West.
What led to the current crisis in Ukraine?
By Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine and director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, in the Brookings Institution's Up Front blog.
By Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine and director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, in the Brookings Institution's Up Front blog.
STRIKING the right balance between relations with the West and relations with Russia has always been Ukraine's central foreign policy challenge. Ukraine's leaders have sought to have it both ways: to grow relations with the United States, the European Union and Nato while also trying to maintain a stable relationship with Russia.
Ukraine regained its independence following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. The Soviet system left the Ukrainian and Russian economies thoroughly intertwined. The Ukrainian energy sector remained hugely dependent on Russia for natural gas, oil and fuel rods for its nuclear reactors.
Historical and cultural links bind the two as well. For most of the 350 years leading up to 1991, Ukraine was part of Russia's empire.
Kiev deliberately built relations with the West as a counterbalance. In the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian government concluded a strategic relationship with the United States, a partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union, and a partnership arrangement with Nato.
In the late 1990s, then president Leonid Kuchma often described his foreign policy as "multi-vector", reaching out to Russia, Europe and the United States. He expressed interest in joining the European Union, but that was clearly not a realistic prospect any time soon.
A Ukraine moving towards the West seriously threatens Russian President Vladimir Putin's geopolitical construct. Moreover, he strives to appear to his domestic political base as a strongman and protector of Russia's national interests. "Losing" Ukraine would undermine that carefully cultivated image.
In January 2008, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko requested a membership action plan (MAP) from Nato. A few weeks later, Mr Putin stood next to Mr Yushchenko at a Kremlin press conference and calmly threatened to target nuclear missiles at Ukraine. The MAP request failed to win consensus support at the April 2008 Nato summit in Bucharest.
In January 2008, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko requested a membership action plan (MAP) from Nato. A few weeks later, Mr Putin stood next to Mr Yushchenko at a Kremlin press conference and calmly threatened to target nuclear missiles at Ukraine. The MAP request failed to win consensus support at the April 2008 Nato summit in Bucharest.
Fast forward to 2013. Ukraine, now under president Viktor Yanukovych, neared signature of an association agreement with the European Union, which includes a free trade arrangement. Its full implementation would prepare the ground for a future EU membership bid - and pull Ukraine irretrievably out of Moscow's orbit.
Mr Putin accordingly cranked up the pressure. Last summer, Russian customs inspectors began to block the import of Ukrainian goods. Kremlin officials threatened all manner of financial ruin should Kiev go forward with signing the agreement.
The threats worked. Mr Yanukovych suspended the association agreement process and instead accepted Mr Putin's gifts of a US$15 billion (S$19 billion) credit line and cheaper gas. But the European Union exerts a powerful pull. Tens of thousands took to the streets of Kiev in November in protest. Stoked by anger over brutal police tactics, the protest swelled to the hundreds of thousands, ultimately bringing down the Yanukovych regime.
What could be the thinking behind Russia's move?
By Matthew Sussex, director of the politics and international relations programme at the University of Tasmania, in The Interpreter blog published by Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy.
By Matthew Sussex, director of the politics and international relations programme at the University of Tasmania, in The Interpreter blog published by Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy.
RUSSIA'S "hardline" behaviour stems directly from its experiences after the Cold War. As the leading republic of the former Soviet Union, Russia lost a great deal of territory and resources and a unifying national idea. The break-up also created a sizeable ethnic Russian diaspora population, much of which was subsequently mistreated.
The situation in Crimea is certainly a reflection of Russia's recent assertiveness. Yet it is equally a reflection of its insecurity. Moscow worries obsessively that Ukraine will be granted Nato membership.
Russia's Crimean move is part of a broader strategy to preserve sub-regional primacy. It is intended for both international and domestic audiences. By intervening in Crimea, Mr Putin's calculation is that it will show any vacillators how far he is prepared to go to secure Russian interests.
An equally important aspect of Russian strategy is to use the West's own logic against it. This makes it look hypocritical and ineffectual, and highlights how malleable "global" international legal and human rights rhetoric can be. Mr Putin's justification for intervening in South Ossetia in 2008 was the Responsibility to Protect. Similarly in Crimea, Putin is pushing the line that he is protecting ethnic Russians from right-wing nationalists. His message is simple: If the West can back a coup against a democratically elected government, Russia can too.
What are the options for the United States?
By Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Jeff Mankoff, a fellow and deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at CSIS, on the CSIS website.
By Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Jeff Mankoff, a fellow and deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at CSIS, on the CSIS website.
THE US has largely deferred to the Europeans throughout this crisis, while maintaining a line to ousted Ukrainian president Yanukovych through Vice-President Joe Biden.
Going forward, the US should ensure that it remains on the same page as its European partners, including contributing additional financial assistance as part of a transitional package.
While coordinating with Brussels is important, the United States has deferred too much responsibility to the EU and the International Monetary Fund, especially on the issue of fixing Ukraine's economy and ensuring that resources are available to assist the transition.
As in early 1992 in Russia, there is a short window of opportunity for US assistance to make a real difference. By failing to respond adequately to the needs and requests of the Boris Yeltsin government in early 1992, the US contributed to the breakdown of Russia's democratic experiment.
Washington needs to move quickly and with considerable strategic foresight to ensure that it does not repeat that mistake in Ukraine today.
Another area the US should focus on is making sure that Moscow remains very much in the loop, while trying to bridge the divide between Russia and the EU that has broken out over Ukraine in the past couple of years and urging Russia to play a constructive role in de-escalating the crisis.
As he did effectively last Friday, President Obama must be ready to continue to directly engage President Putin on occasion to ensure mutual understanding remains on track and to build trust.
This is not because Vice-President Biden or Secretary John Kerry are inadequate in any way; it is simply recognition of the fact that only the US President can engage the Russian President directly and that the Russian system is just a bit more centralised than ours.